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A typical scientist has no responsibility other than to explain how a natural event occurred. 
However, when a philosopher asks about the conditions under which a scientist’s explanation 
is true, he is, in fact, raising an ultimate question, the concept which Karl Popper used for the 
first time. Answering this question requires that no elements are neglected in the explanation, 
and no significant factors in the explanation are overlooked. In other words, in explaining a 
phenomenon, at any level of its explanation, there should be no remainder. These require-
ments can be achieved through the full explanation. In the present article, by drawing on 
concepts such as theory-ladenness of observation, underdetermination of theory by evidence, 
and the role of models and metaphors in developing a scientific theory, it is illustrated that a 
complete explanation includes both a scientific explanation and personal explanation. A per-
sonal explanation comprises mental properties such as belief, desire, and intention, which are 
irreducible to physical properties. Therefore, we cannot provide a personal explanation while 
restricting ourselves to scientific methods. Consequently, it is argued in this article first, the 
personal explanation is irreducible to a scientific explanation. Second, the personal explana-
tion is inevitable in order to provide a full explanation. Third, (methodological) naturalists 
claim that the ultimate judgment of what is natural and unnatural is possible only by scientific 
inquiry. Finally, accepting these three premises entails the inability of a naturalist to answer 
ultimate questions.
Keywords: ultimate question, complete explanation, naturalism, personal explanation, reduc-
tionism.
Introduction
Nowadays, in academic circles and among researchers in philosophy, naturalism is 
no longer considered merely as a philosophical view along with other views. In fact, in all 
branches of philosophy, including philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philoso-
phy of ethics, etc., the naturalistic approach is regarded as a prevailing and relatively main-
stream approach. Therefore, Kim’s description of the status of naturalism in contemporary 
philosophy appears to be an accurate one when he refers to naturalism as “the Ideology 
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of the contemporary analytic philosophy” [1, p. 82]. To explain the relationship between 
naturalism and prominent philosophical movements of the earlier periods, such as ma-
terialism, Sellars considered materialism an ontological view versus mentalism, whereas 
naturalism is a cosmological position opposed to supernaturalism [2, p. 220–224].
Such claims attributed to contemporary naturalists indicate that naturalism encom-
passes a wide range of metaphysics that almost everything, including life, mind, language, 
ethics, aesthetics, and even religion, falls under its umbrella, and it seeks to present a fully 
naturalistic explanation of all of them1.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that naturalism has successfully provided a full ex-
planation of all these fields. One of the challenges facing naturalists, which is examined in 
this article, is the ultimate questions. Perhaps, Karl Popper was the first person to refer to 
the concept of ultimate questions. At the first conference at Darwin College commemo-
rating Darwin, he stated: “It is important to realize that science does not make assertions 
about ultimate questions — about the riddles of existence or about man’s task in this world” 
[4, p. 342]. Later, these questions were mentioned in the scientific and philosophical litera-
ture under various titles. John Wheeler, a prominent American physicist and philosopher, 
introduced five questions as Really Big Questions (RBQ), including [5, p. хi]: “1 — How 
come existence? 2 — Why the quantum? 3 — A participatory universe? 4 — What makes 
meaning? 5 — Is information everything?” He raised these questions to reunite physics and 
metaphysics because modern science sought to explain the hows of the phenomena and 
was not concerned with the whys, which are mostly the concern of philosophy and theol-
ogy. However, twentieth-century scientists and philosophers, such as John Wheeler, raised 
the questions concerning the ‘whys’ in their laboratories and classrooms [5, p. хi].
The main characteristic of the above questions is that they cannot be answered by 
peering through microscopes or conducting experiments even though they are related to 
science. In fact, these questions lay at the intersection of science and philosophy, and to 
further understand the world, science must answer them.
It is also essential to clarify the definition of naturalism assumed by the present ar-
ticle. According to Sellars’ definition, naturalism claims that only natural things exist in 
reality. This is the ontological claim of naturalism. Besides this, there is also the meth-
odological claim stating that the ultimate judgment of what is natural and unnatural is 
possible only by scientific inquiry. According to Kim’s argument, the core of naturalism is 
something like this: “The scientific method is the only method of acquisition of authentic 
knowledge or information in all fields (including philosophy)” [1, p. 87]. This is the defini-
tion of (methodological) naturalism that is assumed in the present article.
According to the explanation provided of ultimate questions and the assumed defini-
tion of naturalism, the main argument of this article is that naturalism, due to the limita-
tions of science’s domain, does not have the explanatory capacity to deal with and answer 
ultimate questions. In other words, anyone who seeks to answer these questions within 
the framework of naturalism either basically has to ignore the questions or go beyond the 
realm of naturalism and violate the above definition. 
To illustrate this point, the concept of full explanation has been used as the middle 
term of this article’s main argument. After discussing the various ways naturalists deal 
with ultimate questions in the first section of the article, I will demonstrate that answering 
1 John Haught [3, p. 14] refers to representatives of naturalistic explanations of each of these concepts.
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these questions requires a full explanation, which will be the subject of the second part 
of the article. Finally, in the third section, I will argue that we inevitably have to provide 
personal explanations to achieve a full explanation. Personal explanations include one of 
the mental properties that are neither ruled by strict laws of science nor are reducible to 
physical properties. Hence, personal explanations are not reducible to scientific explana-
tions, and consequently, naturalism fails to provide a full explanation or answer ultimate 
questions.
1. How naturalism deals with ultimate questions
Generally, to deal with and answer these questions, naturalists have employed three 
different approaches [6, p. 211–220]:
1. Ignoring ultimate questions (naturalistic anti-realism): some naturalistic philoso-
phers believe that we cannot find answers to these questions or even understand 
the questions appropriately; therefore, we should ignore them completely. In con-
temporary analytic philosophy, this kind of view is known as eliminativism. Based 
on the history of science, eliminativists argue that many postulates in science that 
seemed to have an influential explanatory role were completely abandoned as sci-
ence progressed. A typical example in this regard is ether2. Eliminativists in the 
philosophy of mind believe that mental properties and conscious states are ideas 
that belong to folk psychology. Today, since folk psychology has been replaced by 
neuroscience, folk psychology concepts have been abandoned and replaced with 
more precise scientific theories [8, p. 71, 72].
This view is anti-realistic about ultimate questions and the concepts pertinent 
to them, yet it strictly adheres to its naturalistic commitment. Therefore, it could 
be referred to as naturalistic anti-realism. 
2. Attempts to answer ultimate questions applying modern science (naturalistic real-
ism): many philosophers and scientists, while acknowledging these questions, do 
not go beyond naturalistic metaphysics and the scientific method to answer them. 
The method employed by most of them to deal with these questions is scientific 
reductionism. By definition, scientific reductionism means “that the results of in-
quiry in one domain […] can be understood or are explained by the conceptual 
resources of another, more fundamental domain” [9, p. 696]. In naturalists’ view, 
it is assumed that science is more fundamental than philosophy (or any other do-
main of human knowledge). An attempt is made to explain philosophical con-
cepts based on scientific theories. I referred to this approach as naturalistic realism 
because neither of these questions are abandoned nor do we go beyond the realm 
of naturalism.
3. Going beyond the scientific method to answer ultimate questions (non-
naturalistic realism): the third approach to these questions is to use concepts, 
methods, and metaphysics found beyond modern science. In fact, those who 
advocate this approach have no choice but to expand their metaphysics in order 
2 In pre-twentieth century physicists’ view, ether was a continuous material through which light rays 
and wave signals flowed. At the end of the nineteenth century, experiments were conducted that revealed 
flaws with the concept of ether and eventually in 1905, Einstein suggested that ether was a redundant con-
cept [7, p. 4–6].
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to answer ultimate questions. An example of this method is Putnam’s explanation 
of the nature of sets, numbers, functions, and in general, mathematical facts. He 
introduced an idea known as indispensability arguments claiming that these facts 
are indispensable components of a physics theory (such as the law of gravity) and 
must be considered as real existence [10, p. 53–56]. Since this approach takes a 
realistic stance on ultimate questions yet goes beyond the realm of naturalism, it 
is called non-naturalistic realism. 
The above threefold categorization may be applied to all the concepts and issues chal-
lenging naturalism3. However, the argument presented in this article regarding ultimate 
questions concerning the characteristics mentioned in the previous section is specifically 
as follows: first, these questions cannot be denied within modern scientific discourse (ob-
jection of approach 1); and second, a naturalist is not permitted to expand his metaphysics 
in order to answer these questions (objection of approach 3). 
Reviewing the first approach, which suggests completely ignoring these questions, it 
is necessary to reemphasize the definition and characteristics of ultimate questions. An-
swering ultimate questions sometimes have a direct effect on the process of scientific in-
quiry. For instance, a scientist’s viewpoint of human nature (namely, physicalism, dualism, 
or panpsychism) affects his explanation of some human behaviors and properties, the most 
important of which is consciousness. For example, Sir John Eccles4 explains consciousness 
with a dualistic view and draws on Popper’s three worlds as well as quantum mechanics5. 
In contrast to Eccles, the mainstream view in neuroscience and philosophy of mind is 
physicalism, wherein an attempt is made to explain consciousness physicalistically.
On the whole, eliminativism has few adherents in the philosophy of mind, even 
among physicalists. For instance, Jerry Fodor, as a physicalist, argues that folk psychol-
ogy (which assumes the existence of belief, intention, and consciousness) sometimes can 
predict human behaviour much more advanced and accurately than neuroscience. Fodor 
gives the example in which his students can accurately predict that he would be at the 
university conference hall at 10 a.m. on Monday [13, p. 71]. This prediction capability and 
explanatory function do not allow us to ignore these concepts completely.
The third approach, that is, non-naturalistic realism to ultimate questions, leads to 
a contradiction. According to the definition of naturalism presented in the introduction, 
the only warranted method of acquiring authentic knowledge and the sole reliable source 
for judging what exists and what does not exist is a natural science. Accordingly, Kim 
concludes that accepting naturalism requires the acceptance of physical causal closure6 and 
explanatory closure. By explanatory closure, Kim means that no explanation of an event in 
the space-time world needs to invoke any phenomenon or agency outside the space-time 
world [1, p. 92, 93]. Therefore, accepting naturalism, we are not allowed to turn to abstract 
concepts such as mathematical facts or supernatural entities like God or the Hegelian 
3 The four main problems that challenge naturalistic explanation include morality, meaning, mind and 
modality, which are known as the four Ms [11, p. 247].
4 Sir John Eccles (1903–1997), winner of the Nobel Prize in Neuroscience.
5 In chapters 1 and 2 of his book How the Self Controls Its Brain, Eccles provides a detailed description 
of his view and how he reached it [12].
6 Physical causal closure is defined as: “any physical event that has sufficient cause, has sufficient physi-
cal cause” [14, p. 178].
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Absolute Spirit to explain natural phenomena. Thus, it is concluded that the third ap-
proach contradicts naturalism.
Discrediting options 1 and 3, the only approach left to a naturalist facing ultimate 
questions is the second option, which believes that science has sufficient explanatory 
power to answer ultimate questions. This approach has more supporters than the other 
two approaches. Theories proposed in various branches of science, such as Cosmology, 
Evolutionary Biology, and Data Sciences by the title of “Theory of Everything” (or similar 
titles), are related to this approach. However, I demonstrate that this path will eventually 
lead to option 1 or option 3. In fact, when we take the term “everything” in its literal sense 
in the Theory of Everything, then a naturalist will inevitably have to ignore some issues or 
go beyond naturalism to explain them. Therefore, in the following, first, it is shown that 
answering ultimate questions requires a complete explanation; then, it is argued that sci-
ence does not have sufficient explanatory power to provide a complete explanation.
2. Ultimate questions and a complete explanation
The explanation is used to clarify why a particular situation exists. For instance, when 
we ask about the fluidity of the fluids or the greenness of the leaves, the sun’s eclipse, or a 
genetic disease in a fetus, we do not really believe that these phenomena are necessary and 
needless to explain. The phenomenon which is to be explicated and requires elucidation 
is called the explanandum.
The explanation of an explanandum may involve several layers. For example, an ex-
planandum such as ‘free fall of a rigid body’ is explained using Newton’s law of universal 
gravitation. This law clearly shows why a rigid body falls down at a predictable rate. How-
ever, one may inquire about the nature of gravitational force itself as well as its origin. 
Here, Newton’s law of gravitation itself is an explanandum. In the early 1900s, in seeking 
to answer this question, Einstein proposed his general theory of relativity and suggested 
that gravitational waves, which lead eventually some scientists and philosophers to the Big 
Bang theory, explain the cause of gravitational force. However, the question is whether 
Einstein’s explanation is the ultimate one. Does this mean that it will leave no room for 
any further questions? The answer is no. It is still possible to ask why the Big Bang itself 
occurred, what happened before the Big Bang, and its causes. Therefore, the general theory 
of relativity is not a complete explanation either.
Richard Swinburne defines a complete explanation as follows:
“A complete explanation of the occurrence of E is a full explanation7 of its occurrence in 
which all the factors cited are such that there is no explanation (either full or partial) of their 
existence or operation in terms of factors operative at the time of their existence or operation” 
[15, p. 78].
It means that in order to reach a complete explanation, in explaining the gravitational 
force in the above example when Newton’s law of universal gravitation is used, the expla-
nation itself should not contain any element that is an explanandum. However, this is not 
the case. Even when we moved one step back and discussed the general theory of relativity, 
7 Swinburne defines full explanation as follows: “If there is a full cause C for event E (a cause that is 
efficacious for the occurrence of E) and cause R that ensures the efficacy of C, these conditions are what I 
should call ‘full explanation’ of the phenomenon E” [15, p. 24–25].
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there is still some remainder. Thus, a complete explanation could be simply considered 
as an explanation that has “no further phenomena to be explained and the entities and 
properties postulated have a simplicity” [15, p. 87].
This interpretation of a complete explanation brings us closer to the definition and 
characteristics of the ultimate questions. While asking ultimate questions, we do not seek 
to explain a simple physical phenomenon. However, we ask about the fundamental condi-
tions of the universe that have caused the phenomenon’s occurrence. Ultimate questions, 
indeed, are the final or remaining questions in the explanation. Science has explained the 
phenomena and laws by scientific methods as far as possible, but in the end, some ques-
tions have not been answered by conventional methods. For example, when we ask about 
gravity law and then see the general theory of relativity, there are still questions such as 
‘how was the universe created and what was it created from?’ which are ultimate questions 
about the explanation of gravity.
The fact that ultimate questions ask about the endpoint of an explanation indicates 
that in order to answer these questions, we need a complete explanation. This explanation 
is the endpoint and does not have any remainder.
3. Incompleteness of naturalism in providing a complete explanation
In the first section, we saw that the only sensible way of answering ultimate questions 
from a naturalistic perspective is to use the scientific method and scientific explanation 
and remain restricted within this framework. Therefore, considering the discussion in the 
previous section, we need to find out whether a scientific explanation can answer ultimate 
questions or, as explained in the previous section, whether it can provide a complete ex-
planation. The answer to this question, according to the present article, is negative. The 
following argument presents the reason why naturalism is incapable of answering ultimate 
questions:
1. To answer ultimate questions, as well as to explain any phenomenon, naturalism 
has to stay within the limits of scientific explanation.
2. Complete explanation means reaching the endpoint of explanation where no 
elements remain unexplained.
3. There is always some personal explanation among the list of explanatory elements 
in a complete explanation of a phenomenon.
4. The personal explanation is not reducible to (or explainable by) scientific 
explanation.
5. The personal explanation is not compatible with naturalism.
6. Consequently, a complete explanation cannot be provided within the framework 
of naturalism. 
In this argument, premise 1 was explained in the first section. It was clarified that, 
based on the definition of naturalism and explanatory closure, which Kim mentions as a 
critical characteristic of naturalism, to explain any issue, including the answer to ultimate 
questions, the only available tool is the scientific explanation. Premise 2 is also derived 
from the definition of complete explanation presented in the second section. However, 
premises 3 and 4 require further reasoning and more clarification, which is provided in 
the following section.
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3.1. Complete explanation requires personal explanation
In this section, some reasons are provided for premise 3. First, a few points regarding 
science and the scientific method should be mentioned. According to logical positivism, 
the scientific method was considered through the verification principle, which emphasized 
only observation and experimentation. Thus, statements that did not follow this method 
were considered meaningless. Eliminativism, which was discussed previously, is one of 
the implications of this approach. In fact, positivists sought to purify language from non-
experimental factors [16, p. 22–23]. Nevertheless, considering the history of science and 
exploring the actual scientific theories revealed that a scientific theory is much more com-
plicated than what the positivists assumed.
By taking a more profound look at observation, which is a critical factor in the sci-
entific method, philosophers of science paid attention to the role of subjective elements. 
They argued that when scientists observe an objective phenomenon, they cannot be com-
pletely free of their own theories and subjective values; insofar as these theories some-
times affect observation. To provide an example, consider what is known as ‘sunspots’. 
It is a phenomenon recognized by Chinese astronomers centuries ago. However, in Eu-
rope, due to the belief that heavenly bodies are immovable, this objective and variable 
terrestrial phenomenon was ignored until the Copernican revolution [17, p. 112]. Such 
dependence of the observer on subjective values is labelled ‘theory-ladenness of observa-
tion’ by Thomas Kuhn8.
Moreover, philosophers of science turned away from the positivist’s view resorting 
to the principle called ‘underdetermination of theory by data.’ According to this principle, 
there is more than one theory consistent with experimental evidence in most cases. Thus, 
choosing a theory requires something more than experimental evidence; it means that 
subjective factors are also involved [17, p. 162]. For example, underdetermination of theory 
by data could be applied to the geocentric Ptolemaic theory versus Copernicus’s heliocentric 
theory. Regarding explanatory precision, both theories explained the location of the pla- 
nets as well as the time of occurrence of solar and lunar eclipses with the same degree of 
accuracy, and non-experimental criteria were needed to choose one over the other.
In addition to the above two reasons, some philosophers of science have pointed out 
the undeniable role of metaphors in science, such as ‘wavelength’, ‘electric field’, ‘black hole’, 
etc., which fill the scientific language deficiency [18, p. 319]. Furthermore, some other phi-
losophers of science have argued that models9 have a similar role in science. Models such 
as the ‘plum pudding model’ or ‘particle-wave model of light’ are concepts or frameworks 
used by scientists to interpret data and develop scientific theories. Models and metaphors 
are not objective entities in the world, but somewhat subjective conceptions formed by 
the human mind. Therefore, it should be considered that nature does not necessarily ope- 
rate based on the models; instead, models are trapping parts of reality like fishing nets. 
Accordingly, the selection of the model is a decision made by a subject. The subject must 
choose from many models or curves that pass through countless recorded data and select 
8 After Thomas Kuhn, there was somehow a consensus among philosophers of science about this sub-
ject and the observer effect on the observation, but there is some disagreement as to how far this can be 
used in favour of scientific anti-realism. Realist philosophers of science believe that, in spite of this reality, 
the effect of theories on observations can be reduced by conducting more experiments and more and more 
diverse observers. 
9 Models may be considered as another form of metaphor in science.
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the one that best approximates reality and meets the criteria of simplicity, calculability, 
etc.10
In light of the abovementioned reasons, scrutinizing the scientific theory appears in 
at least three situations where the footprint of subjective factors can be found: 1) In ob-
serving and reporting experimental data (theory-ladenness); 2) In choosing among scien-
tific theories (underdetermination); and 3) In interpreting experimental data and simpli-
fication of the behaviour of nature in order to make it understandable and theorize upon 
it (metaphors and models).
It is noteworthy that scientific anti-realists use subjective factors in a scientific theory 
as strong evidence to argue in their own favor [19, p. 63]. This issue in the debate between 
realists and anti-realists should be meticulously examined, but here we do not seek to 
argue in favor of anti-realism because when we talk about explaining a natural phenom-
enon such as an apple falling to the ground, physics provides its full explanation wherein 
subjective issues do not appear to disturb the accuracy and universality of the explanation. 
Models and metaphors, put to experimental test, constantly improve and approximate 
reality11. However, in all these cases, the main challenge is providing a complete explana-
tion — not full explanation — which is the subject of this article. According to what was 
mentioned in the previous section, a complete explanation is a secondary explanation or 
an explanation of the explanation. Here, all the elements used in a full explanation must, in 
turn, be examined. It is in this second stage of explanation that subjective explanations are 
usually introduced. If a full explanation can explain and predict Perfect Gas’s behaviour 
fairly well, it has done its job. In this case, actually, no questions remain about why and 
how this explanation is correct or where its curve comes from. However, for a complete 
explanation, all the elements and factors used in the explanation should not be left without 
explanation.
3.2. Irreducibility of personal explanation
This section is devoted to defending premise 4. What is meant by personal explana-
tion is that in explaining a phenomenon or an explanandum, we are concerned with the 
person’s conscious action and why that motivates them to do so, instead of asking how 
the physical laws caused that phenomenon. Richard Swinburne states that in personal 
explanation, we provide an explanation based on the following components: “A person (S) 
with certain powers (P), beliefs (B) and purposes (G)” [21, p. 3]. For instance, when we 
consider a murderer shooting a victim, the murderer (S), who has a gun and the power to 
shoot (P), does so with the purpose of killing the other person (G) and believing that he 
deserves to die (B).
Due to its components (especially ‘purpose’ and ‘belief ’), the above definition dis-
tinguishes personal explanation from scientific explanation. Dennett12 distinguishes the 
personal and sub-personal levels of explanation, stating that “it is only on the personal level 
10 For example, consider the data obtained from the pressure change per volume at a constant tem-
perature for a gas, which includes numerous points on a pressure-volume graph.
11 Although there are issues, such as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, which are 
considered by the mainstream physicists to be essentially indeterminate and inexplicable by natural causes 
[20, p. 56].
12 Daniel Dennett (1942–…), American Cognitive Scientist and naturalist philosopher of mind.
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that explanation proceeds in terms of the needs, desires, intentions, and beliefs of an actor 
in an environment” [22, p. 164].
Here, my argument is that personal explanation fundamentally differs from scientific 
explanation because of its different elements, purpose, and explanatory level. In personal 
explanation, as seen in the components mentioned in Swinburne’s and Dennett’s defini-
tions, we deal with issues such as belief and desire, which are studied under the general 
title of ‘mental properties’ in the philosophy of mind. An essential characteristic of ‘mental 
properties’ is that they are not ruled by strict laws, such as laws of physics. This is Da-
vidson’s famous argument according to which, in physical causation, there is a principle 
stipulating that physical events are ruled by strict laws. For instance, the fall of a rigid body 
or electric current in a conductor can be explained by strict laws of physics. Therefore, it 
is stated that these phenomena have a nomological property. However, mental properties 
and mental phenomena do not possess this property. Strict laws do not rule our beliefs 
and intentions; they are governed by human rationality, and human rationality does not 
have a specific location in the brain. Hence, rationality cannot be measured or observed to 
explain or predict human behaviour [23, p. 122–124]. This distinction causes an unbridge-
able gap between mental and physical properties, which prevents reducibility.
Another fundamental difference between personal explanation and scientific expla-
nation is to be sought in the element of ‘intention.’ Intention can be interpreted as the end 
or final cause among Aristotle’s Four Causes. Intention and purpose are the prerequisites 
of personal explanation. In the example of killing another person, if we ignore the killer’s 
intention, we have provided almost no persuasive explanation of the main event. Suppose 
all the scientific evidence, including the fingerprint of the murderer, the type of gun, the 
shooting distance, and so on, are available to the judge. However, he has no idea what the 
murderer’s intention was. Then this homicide will be no different to him than the case of 
someone killed in a car crash or on the battlefield. Scientific reasons and evidence do not 
provide a complete (and convincing) explanation of this phenomenon.
Nonetheless, the end and final cause are not included in a scientific explanation. 
Therefore, it is generally said that the final cause has no place in modern science. Natural 
scientists and naturalist philosophers argue that having a final and teleological explana-
tion is the concern of art and craftsmanship, but natural sciences that deal with uncon-
scious nature are free from final cause13 [25, p. 11].
Due to the abovementioned differences between the components of personal expla-
nation and scientific explanation14, we can argue in favor of the fundamental distinction 
between these two types of explanation and the irreducibility of personal explanation to 
scientific explanation. There are also independent arguments in favor of the irreducibility 
of mental properties to physical properties, most famous of which is the ‘multiple realizabil-
ity’. According to this argument, a mental property (e. g., pain) may correspond to several 
physical properties (e.  g., C-fiber firing in one organism and D-fiber firing in another 
13 It should be noted that rejection of teleology in science means negation of a priori purpose and 
not negation of function. Modern science accepts functional explanations. This is particularly important in 
evolutionary biology. In the theory of evolution, one the one hand, it is questioned whether the world serves 
a purpose, but on the other hand, every organism moves towards more adaptation according to a purpose-
ful pattern. Purposefulness which is accepted in the theory of evolution is called ‘telenaturalism’ in which 
purpose serves a more descriptive rather than explanatory role. (For further study in this area, see [24].)
14 And other differences such as ‘privileged access’ to mental states and ‘subjectivity’, all of which can 
be found in the literature on philosophy of mind but are not discussed in the present article.
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organism). In short, this argument states that a mental property cannot be considered as 
simply corresponding to a specific physical property [26, p. 131]. This argument is a turn-
ing point in philosophers’ refrain from physical reductionism [26, p. 129]. Implication and 
generalization of this argument also includes the irreducibility of special sciences (such as 
economics, sociology, psychology, and biology) to physics. In fact, multiple realizability 
states that there are no strict laws to link a mental property, such as the elements men-
tioned in the definition of personal explanation (including belief and desire), to a physical 
property [27].
Nevertheless, regardless of multiple realizability, my argument is that assuming re-
ductionism, we have no reason to admit purposefulness of human actions as well as a 
moral responsibility. As we saw in the previous section, scientific explanation embraces the 
principle of explanatory closure and does not go beyond the limits of natural (temporal-
spatial) issues to explain phenomena. Thus, by accepting reductionism, we are forced to 
reduce things such as desire and belief to objective elements such as brain interactions. 
The direct implication of such reduction is that there is no preferential criterion that dis-
tinguishes one person’s action from another person’s action (remember the example of 
killing a person). Hence, reductionism not only renders man’s actions devoid of meaning 
but also ignores his moral responsibility, which could impose significant costs. Therefore, 
due to this outcome’s inconsistency with our intuition and unreasonableness to accept 
these costs, the less costly way is to abandon reductionism — what many philosophers 
(even naturalist philosophers) have preferred to do.
In summation, in the third section of this article, I presented an argument to dem-
onstrate that naturalism is incapable of providing a complete explanation. In the last two 
parts, I tried to give reasons in favor of the 3 and 4 premises of the argument. Premise 5 of 
the argument, which stated that ‘personal explanation could not be explained by natural-
ism,’ is a result of combining premise 4 and the definition of naturalism. In fact, if a per-
sonal explanation cannot be reduced to a scientific explanation, based on the definition of 
methodological naturalism, the personal explanation will be inconsistent with naturalism. 
Premise 6, which is the conclusion of the argument, results from combining premise 3 and 
premise 5.
Conclusion
The present article explains how the naturalistic approach deals with ultimate ques-
tions. By admitting the scientific method as the sole source of gaining reliable knowledge 
and accepting its limitations, naturalism cannot have an anti-realistic view on ultimate ques-
tions because these questions’ answers shed light on scientific theories. Secondly, a naturalist 
cannot go beyond the scientific method’s framework and take an anti-naturalistic approach. 
However, answering these questions requires a complete explanation, which does not leave 
any factor or remains of any element even in higher explanandum levels. 
Since complete explanation includes personal explanation, naturalism can provide 
a complete explanation only if it also includes personal explanation or if personal expla-
nations are reduced to scientific explanations. Nevertheless, personal explanation contains 
mental properties such as belief and desire, which are prevented from being reduced to sci-
entific explanation. Consequently, naturalism does not possess sufficient explanatory power 
to provide a complete explanation and, as a result, cannot answer ultimate questions.
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Оценка объясняющей силы натурализма в решении важнейших вопросов
Дж. Дарвиш Агаджани
Технологический университет им. Шарифа, 
Исламская Республика Иран, 11365–11155, Тегеран, ул. Азади
Для цитирования: Darvish Aghajani J. Assessing the explanatory power of naturalism in addressing 
ultimate questions // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтоло- 
гия. 2021. Т. 37. Вып. 2. С. 217–228. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.203
Обычно ученые-натуралисты свою задачу видят лишь в  том, чтобы объяснять при-
родные явления. Когда же философы спрашивают об условиях, в силу которых объ-
яснения, данные учеными, являются истинными, то они, по сути, задают предельный 
вопрос — в том смысле, в котором писал об этом Карл Поппер. Чтобы ответить на этот 
вопрос, необходимо учесть все моменты и  важные факторы. Другими словами, при 
объяснении явления на любом уровне этого объяснения не должно оставаться ничего 
неучтенного. Эти требования могут быть выполнены посредством исчерпывающего 
объяснения. В данной статье при помощи указания на теоретическую нагруженность 
опыта, невыводимость теории из опыта и роль моделей и метафор в создании научной 
теории показано, что исчерпывающее объяснение включает в  себя как научное, так 
и субъективное объяснение. Субъективное объяснение содержит ментальные компо-
ненты, такие как убеждения, желания и намерения, которые не сводятся к физическим 
характеристикам. Следовательно, придерживаясь научных методов, мы будем избегать 
субъективного объяснения. Таким образом, в  статье доказывается, что, во-первых, 
субъективное объяснение не сводится к научному объяснению; во-вторых, субъектив-
ное объяснение необходимо для получения исчерпывающего объяснения; в-третьих, 
(методологические) натуралисты утверждают, что окончательное суждение о том, что 
является естественным и неестественным, возможно только путем научного исследо-
вания; наконец, принятие этих трех посылок влечет за собой вывод о том, что натура-
листы неспособны ответить на предельные вопросы.
Ключевые слова: главный вопрос, полное объяснение, натурализм, личное объяснение, 
редукционизм.
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